A Season of (Info) Sharing:
An Empirical Assessment of Intelligence Reform

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Abstract

Few can argue that recent efforts to reform the intelligence community (IC) have failed to improve the overall quality of intelligence analysis. Yet, despite the many positive outcomes associated with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), one emerging trend threatens to undermine the reform process: an obsession with information sharing. Though the need to share information is paramount in a globalized world, a more sinister flaw in the intelligence system resulted in the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) failure. That flaw is groupthink. To test our hypothesis, we conduct an empirical investigation of intelligence reform movements by developing an Intelligence Reform Lexicon – an extensive dictionary of terms associated with IRTPA – and use intext software to machine code government and academic literature from the period of 1995 to 1997 to compare emphasis on groupthink through use of certain types of words. Our results suggest that, in order to mitigate the negative effects of groupthink, the IC needs to conduct more extensive academic outreach efforts. This should be achieved by following the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission's recommendation to establish a not-for-profit funded open-source research institution.

A Season of (Info) Sharing

The year 1976 has often been called the “year of intelligence” owing to the widespread negative attention that the Church Committee and the release of the Family Jewels brought to the Intelligence Community (IC). The years immediately following
9/11, too, should probably receive a similar moniker. Two catastrophic intelligence failures followed by the most sweeping overhaul the intelligence community experienced since 1947— all within a five year period—merit more than an historical footnote.

The current intelligence reform movement, described as a “bomb dropped on the intelligence community” by longtime scholar Arthur Hulnick, is policymakers’ response to the back-to-back intelligence failures of 9/11 and the 2003 Saddam Hussein Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) fiasco.[1] Much of the guiding impetus of the movement stems from the Thomas Kean National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, which concluded that, prior to 9/11, the intelligence system was "Blinking Red" with warnings and indicators. FBI agents in particular, entrenched in their law-enforcement mentality, failed to enter potentially actionable raw intelligence into the necessary databases, thereby preventing law enforcement personnel from recognizing a major terrorist attack was imminent.[2] The Silberman-Robb WMD report, issued shortly after the 9/11 Commission, provided policymakers with further guidance in undertaking the then-fledging overhaul of the IC. The report concluded that intelligence analysis was "dead wrong" in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's WMD and that this constituted a major intelligence failure.[3] Both reports indicted the IC for failing to adequately share information, collect meaningful intelligence, undertake rigorous analysis, or engage in inter-agency cooperation.

With these particular aspects of the intelligence process in mind, lawmakers crafted the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. It made sweeping changes to the structure of the intelligence community in an attempt to increase the quality of intelligence, promote information sharing, and prepare the intelligence community to better fight the so-called
‘long war’ against radical extremism. According to the official House and Senate Committees on Intelligence (HPSCI and SSCI) testimony available in the public domain, as well as the writing of prominent intelligence scholars, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act took meaningful steps to improve the quality of intelligence and encourage cross-agency cooperation. [4] Like all legislation, however, IRTPA was not perfect. As the debate over intelligence reform raged throughout 2004 and into the present, certain aspects of the two intelligence failures began to be forgotten, while others received undue attention.

One term in particular has come to disproportionately dominate the intelligence reform lexicon: information sharing. References to the need to share information saturate nearly every official government publication available in the public domain. HPSCI and SSCI testimony is overloaded with details pertaining to the Information Sharing Environment, the Analysts Yellow Pages, or other information sharing initiatives. Earlier this year, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) published an official strategy for information sharing. A year earlier, DNI Mike McConnell published the Intelligence Community’s 500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration, which ranked the need to “accelerate information sharing” as the Community’s second most pressing priority. But as Mark Lowenthal points out in a recent article, blaming the events of 9/11 on a failure to share information alone is to grossly oversimplify and misrepresent the ‘lessons learned' of 9/11 and Iraq.[5] Other, more sinister flaws in the intelligence process played a role in creating a system poised for failure.

Groupthink
The Levin report, issued in October 2004, warned against “one of the most serious and persistent flaws of the current system of intelligence analysis and estimates: the politicization of intelligence....”[6] The commission found evidence that, in the case of Iraq’s relationship with al Qaeda, intelligence was exaggerated to support Administration policy aims, primarily by finding a strong connection between Iraq and al Qaeda when one, in fact, did not exist. The fact that two independent analysis agencies, the DOE and the Air Force, actually disproves the Bush Administration’s assertion that faulty intelligence alone is to blame.[7] These groups’ dissenting voices were simply not heard over the vehement cry that Saddam still harbored biological and chemical stockpiles developed in mobile laboratories. Whether or not the claim of politicization is justified, this example shows that another inherent enemy of intelligence can be attributed to the Iraq assessment with more certainty: groupthink.

Evidence of groupthink was cited in both the Senate Iraq Report of 2004 and the Silberman-Robb WMD Report. In the Senate report, the third Key Finding states that analysts “suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing” WMD program and that this “groupthink” directly led analysts to interpret “ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program.”[8] The WMD Commission put it more bluntly: “intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam's intentions.” Testifying before the SSCI in 2004, then CEO of CSIS John Hamre noted that it is natural for “group consciousness to develop in the intelligence and policy world when basic propositions are accepted as true.”[9] He then commented on the insular nature of the intelligence process, observing that since intelligence professionals are forced to work in secrecy, outside voices are rarely heard. This is true, according to
Hamre, especially when professionals are surrounded by a responsive and eager staff, as professionals’ actions and attitudes can determine what information flows to them.

In his 2008 book *Your Government Failed You*, Richard Clarke expresses a belief that groupthink is a “regular part” of the national intelligence estimating process, citing the lack of “real discussion of opposing views” during meetings of the sixteen intelligence agency heads. While Clarke’s experiences date from the Reagan Era, the overall stagnation of the NIE process throughout the early 1990s and into the latter years of the Clinton Administration suggest that little had changed when George W. Bush became president. It should not have been a surprise to intelligence officials that groupthink would eventually pose a real problem for policymakers. Yet, despite the obvious role groupthink played in the 2003 Iraq NIE, almost no efforts have been made to address the pitfalls of this deadly enemy of intelligence – in fact, the 2004 legislation may have made groupthink an even greater threat to analytic rigor.

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), created under the 2004 legislation, was designed to serve as an all-source fusion center for all terrorism related intelligence. It is organized along functional lines and staffed by analysts with terrorism related expertise rather than contextual expertise.[10] Since the goal of the center is to bring the intelligence components into a single place, the NCTC runs counter to IRTPA’s goal of increased competitive analysis; thus, the creation of the NCTC may have set the stage for further episodes of groupthink down the road. If the IC is interested in truly adapting to reduce the chances of future WMD scenarios, it should seriously consider ways to avoiding the pitfalls of groupthink.

**Methodology**
One method of avoiding groupthink is to bring in outside experts who can think strategically about past, present, and future intelligence challenges. The academics who study intelligence for a living could serve as a reservoir of outside knowledge and opinion to contrast with the homegrown intelligence analysts who currently are the sole source of assessments. We decided to compare academic and government-sponsored documents (henceforth called sources) before those attacks to see which provided the most coverage to the specific flaws in the intelligence process identified by the Kean and WMD Commissions. The core of our approach is word frequency content analysis—by studying how often key words and phrases related to intelligence reform are used, we can take an empirical measure of the relative importance each source placed on these aspects of intelligence analysis. This method is unusual, but word frequencies have been used before in academic research on similar subjects. One attempted to catalogue the use of a certain phrase by U.S. officials to demonstrate changes in official U.S. foreign policy towards “rogue states.”[11] We decided to compare a portion of the academic literature and government documents from a time before 9/11 in the mid-90s. We hoped that by choosing a time of relative peace we would avoid the knee-jerk reactions at the heart of the “Shock Theory” of intelligence reform.[12]

Since we did not have access to classified documents, we were forced to rely on the major government report that came out during that time who hoped to study, the Aspin-Brown report (ASPIN). We considered using congressional testimony from HPSCI and SSCI, but the lack of declassified documents and the difficulties in accounting for day-to-day political vagaries ruled out that option. There is also a distinct difference in
vocabulary for prepared documents as compared to actual testimony and questions and accounting for that would be have been quite difficult.

We went through the two leading intelligence journals, the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Labeled IJIC) and Intelligence and National Security (Labeled LOCH), and copied all of the text from those journals’ articles into a text-only document (ignoring editorials and book reviews). We also found portions of the CIA’s in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, and coded those as well (Labeled SII).

We included abstracts if provided, as well as citations, since we decided that the best way to quantitatively compare the importance attached by each source to each word was to count the total number of times that word appeared in the text of that source. Even headings are useful for our purposes since we are attempting to measure the amount of importance placed on these terms, and setting off terms in bold in headers is certainly part of that measure.

To compare the relative amount of attention each source paid to each major category of intelligence analysis reform, we had to create a lexicon of words relevant to intelligence analysis that we could use to compare. We derived most of these words by examining the literature and major reports since 9/11 and the Iraq war, particularly the Silberman-Robb and Kaine Commission. For instance, mentions of the NIE were relevant to long-term planning, and mentions of “stovepiping” would be relevant to information sharing. The major categories of our lexicon were direct analysis, interagency cooperation, information sharing, intelligence estimates, and terrorism (See Lexicon Results, Appendix A). All of them relate to the lexicon of intelligence analysis reform in
various ways, but need to be divided into those different categories in order to help us readily study how well each source performed in those categories.

To expedite the process of counting word frequencies, we used a computer program called “intext” that quickly compiled lists of word mentions from within the larger document. This allowed us to check word frequencies much faster and with a higher level of certitude than looking through the documents for each word individually. Since intext arranged words alphabetically, we could also easily see word variants and account for those as well. Using results generated from intext, we counted the number of times each word or a close variant of the word was mentioned and input it into an excel document.

For some terms, such as “law enforcement,” “pressure,” and others, context mattered. We did not want to count law enforcement mentions not related to intelligence, so we went through the actual document and looked at each word in context. Other words like “analysis” we decided would be relevant no matter what the context and were thus counted in that manner.

To measure inter-coder reliability, both researchers coded the frequencies of each term in the lexicon. If disparities were found, we talked through the differences and settled on whose interpretation best suited the contextual evidence. Although both coders completely coded all sources, for simplicity’s sake we decided to select a coder for each whose results would be used in the final analysis. In the end, Chiego’s code was used for IJIC, ASPIN, and LOCH while Cole’s was used for SII and Silberman-Robb.

We then took the total number of mentions of the lexicon words in each category and divided them by the total number of words in each source. Thus we obtained a
percentage for each category that measured how much space in a given source was devoted to a given term. We also gave each source its own score by combining all of lexicon mentions from that source and dividing that total by the word total (See Lexicon Results, Appendix A) and also consolidated all of the academic sources and all of the government sources (See Govt. vs. Academe, Appendix A). We accounted for variability in verbosity by removing common words that were not important nouns. This made it slightly easier to compare the amount of space devoted to discussions of relevant words. In order to get a statistic for each source that would make for easy comparison against the other sources, we multiplied the number.

Thus our formula was:

\[
\frac{\text{(# of mentions of lexicon words in a given category or source)}}{\text{(total words in source after excluding certain irrelevant words)}} \times 1000 = \text{Analysis Relevance Score}
\]

**Results**

As expected, the Silberman-Robb performed best, which confirmed that our choice of lexicon words, while imperfect, was at least close to what was expected. While our samples were not random and we have little comparable data, they should be at least statistically significant due to the high number of words we included in our samples. IJIC performed nearly as well as ASPIN on most categories but took a commanding lead in mentions of terrorism. LOCH severely underperformed compared to the other sources, which may be partly attributed to its focus on the historical intelligence issues.

Since journals in general address a wider range of topics than intelligence reform reports, it is not surprising that the government sources on average performed better than the academic ones. The closeness of the scores, however, particularly for the IJIC,
suggests that academics are providing provoking and relevant commentary on current intelligence issues. Moreover, the academics are not disconnected; they appear to have a similar range of interests as the actual reports and, in fact, may be ahead of the official reports on some important issues. Terrorism, in particular, is an area where academics far out-paced government literature. This could be due at least in part to the well-known upsurge in worldwide incidents of terrorism during the mid-1990s.

Notably, however, there are significantly fewer mentions of groupthink compared to mentions of information sharing. To confirm that this was not simply a question of failing to use the correct terms, we tried searching for a number of variants of groupthink such as “competitive analysis” and found very few mentions as well. Although we concerned our search with analysis-related topics, our methods suggested that other categories suffer as well from being neglected; we ran “collection” related words and received a score of 5 from the Silberman-Robb report, which was dwarfed by the 16 for analysis.

**Limitations/Future Research**

The empirical approach that we attempted in this paper is not perfect. It is constrained in its explanatory power by the limits of secrecy and rhetoric. We are not privy to internal documents and reports that could be more valuable in effecting changes in the intelligence community than the blue-ribbon report we used nor are we sure that the rhetoric of change actually leads to substantive changes. It is also limited by its novelty--to our knowledge, no other intelligence related research has used our methodology.
In the short-term, we hope to code the articles in the academic journals specifically related to intelligence reform, since part of the problem with LOCH was the overall historical emphasis of the journal. Currently, our method somewhat unfairly compares the whole spread of academic research on intelligence with highly specialized government intelligence.

Future additions and deletions of the lexicon will likely be necessary, as different authors employ different terms for similar subjects. Coder bias also comes into play in some situations which require the coder to make judgment calls as to whether or not a work can be considered part of the lexicon. This danger is especially apparent in nebulous words such as “pressure” that can have a variety of interpretations.

**Academic Outreach**

In investigating potential reforms to correct for groupthink, we concluded that truly independent, outside analysis should be introduced to the intelligence community. Current academic outreach efforts, however, are uncoordinated, informal, and limited at best. To accomplish the goal of injecting more independent thought into the intelligence process, we looked to America’s great storehouse of knowledge – academe. By reaching out to the academic community and increasing the already rich ties between the IC and the nation’s university systems, the IC can gain meaningful insights and alternative opinions.

The intelligence community and the ‘groves of academe’ share a storied past. When FDR formed the OSS Office of Research and Analysis during WWII, he turned to Ivy League universities, and when the CIA first came into existence in 1947, it opened its doors to academia and drew much of its “bureaucratic cohesion” from a “network of ‘old
Since then, academia has continued to provide the building blocks on which intelligence analysis is based. As Richard Pipes, Chairman of the now infamous Team B competitive analysis group of the Ford Era, notes, the CIA’s analytic staff inevitably “share the outlook of U.S. academe” because the “intellectual equipment” used to analyze secret information is derived from academia. Academics are regularly consulted on world affairs and debriefed by the NCS upon their return from visits abroad. Conferences, research projects, books and articles are often commissioned by the CIA, sometimes for their scholarly content, other times for propaganda. To quote Dr. Loch K. Johnson, “Tangled connections, both formal and informal, [between academics and the IC] have ranged from bringing scholars in residence at major universities to occasional telephone conversations with leading experts.” In short, the majority of the Community’s academic outreach efforts occur on an ad hoc basis, with more informal communication than formal.

While most academic outreach occurs in the form of social networking and individual consultation, the IC has also established several organizations devoted entirely to expanding its connections with those outside the realm of intelligence. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), the successor of the World War II era Office of Reports and Estimates, is the intelligence community’s center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking. Now housed in the ODNI, the NIC is charged with producing the community-wide National Intelligence Estimates and coordinating outreach efforts to non-government experts in academia and the private sector. According to the NIC’s official mission statement, one of the organization’s goals is to provide policymakers with the “best, unvarnished, and unbiased information – regardless of whether analytic judgments
conform to US policy.”[16] Currently, it is engaged in a series of forward looking analysis projects, most notably the 2025 Project, which seeks to assess the future threat environment the United States will face.

Recognizing that we now live in a world of ever-evolving threats,[17] the ODNI recently established the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) to spearhead high-risk technology research and development projects. It seeks to develop advanced collection and analytic systems to maximize the value of data collected from all sources and the insight gleaned from the collected information. According to its mission statement, IARPA is the intelligence community’s first public – and truly independent – research center. Failures are accepted as long as they are fully documented and not due to a lack of programmatic integrity. Competitive salaries and awards are offered to researchers in an attempt to draw the best and brightest away from the ‘groves of academe,’ and the center boasts a truly cross-community focus.

**A New Perspective on Academic Outreach**

While the NIC and IARPA – in addition to providing informal social networking outlets – constitute vital academic outreach programs, alone they are not enough to curtail the risk of groupthink. These organizations are, as they stand, only designed to supplement the larger analytic apparatus. They do not have the authority to organize and centralize academic outreach. Taking these limitations of outreach in mind, the Silberman-Robb report recommended that the ODNI establish a not-for-profit, outside research institute to serve as a critical window into outside expertise for the IC. Under the Silberman-Robb plan, the institute would be funded by the intelligence community, but would be free to conduct strategic and independent analysis without risk of politicization
or failure. It would serve as a central nerve center for coordinating academic outreach to
the world’s ever expanding network of universities, non-profits and Federally Funded
Research Centers. While IRTPA did mandate “alternative analysis,” no clear framework
was developed for implementation of this concept. The independent research center
concept was abandoned in favor of traditional consultation efforts, although the IC has
finally moved to embrace open-source methodology once and for all.

Considering the insular nature of the intelligence analysis process – and
considering the vast amounts of untapped expertise inherent in the academic community
– we recommend the establishment of a substantial independent open-source research
institution to supplement current internal analysis. The institute would be funded,
budgeted and overseen by the ODNI, though the ODNI would not play a role in setting
research priorities beyond requiring the center to conduct a yearly “State of the
Intelligence Community” assessment in which intelligence priorities, analytic tradecraft,
collection methods and structural reform efforts evaluated. Freed from the day to day
pressures of ad hoc analysis, the institute would be able to conduct objective and much
needed alternative analysis of all NIEs and other national assessments. Mirroring the CIA
Officer in Residence program, scholars would be solicited for year-long sabbaticals at the
institute, during which time they would work on original research projects. Scholars
would be selected based on a competitive selection process similar to that employed by
the National Science Foundation. The institute should be provided an adequate budget to
provide salaries ranging from $140,000-170,000, the average salary for top professors at
major research institutions, to lure experts away from university positions. This would
constitute a permanent measure for mitigating the effects of groupthink, as well as improve the short term quality of intelligence analysis.

**Challenges**

The top challenge to increasing ties to the academic community will be public opposition to “spooks” on campus. As long as the IC has had connections with academia—which means as long as there has been an IC—public opposition in the form of anti-CIA demonstrations, propaganda and even the occasional attempted citizens arrest of Officers in Residence has prevented the CIA from establishing more overt connections.

Many criticisms of the CIA on campus are valid. As Dr. Johnson points out in *America’s Secret Power*, “Secret research is anathema to the traditions of the University in peacetime and should be eschewed by scholars.” By formalizing the IC-Academia relationship through a budget processing subject to HPCSI and SSCI oversight, some of these legitimate concerns could be mitigated.
Notes


Appendix A

Figure 1  
Lexicon Results

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Silberman-Robb

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Figure 2

Figure 3

Total Scores by Document

Score

Document
Figure 4

Govt vs. Academe

Appendix B

Intelligence Reform Lexicon
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